Patents may not establish clear property and use rights and this may promote biodiversity destruction and decline. What is needed are schemes for patents to suit conservation and sustainable-use objectives.
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At least in theory, the property value in the biological resources established by controlling access through a contract can be distinguished from the value of the potential intellectual property from using that biological resource, so that some of the value of the intellectual property can contribute to the compensation and incentive for biological diversity conservation. At its simplest, property rights over the accessed biological resources deal with the tangible biological resources. Patents, meanwhile, relate to the intangible innovation and creativity in products and processes that result from using the biological resource. A patent deals with an invention that is novel, not obvious, is industrially useful and described in a way that can be followed by others, and establishes exclusive rights to certain dealings with the invention 6 . Property rights and patents are different economy commodities, the former the tangible biological resource and the latter the intangible application of that biological resource for an innovative or creative and useful purpose.
This distinction between tangible and intangible may not, however, be so elegant in practice. A modern patent confounds both the right to deal with the biological resource as it is embodied in a tangible form (such as a purified and isolated gene sequence, or a composition per se), and the right to prevent others from using the biological resource in other embodiments (such as the gene sequence in a diagnostic device). In short, the uncertainty arises because past claims (and disclosures in the public domain) to compositions per se may limit the value of future uses of the same or similar compositions, even where those uses are entirely different, because the patent's 'exclusive rights' are attached to the composition per se marginal social returns, and so favor biological diversity destruction and decline 3 . The solution is to establish biodiversity as an object of transaction (the thing sold and bought) by regulating access and benefit sharing (a form of property) to allow part of the social value for individual economic activities to be appropriated. People likely to undertake the conservation activities are thus compensated and provided with an incentive to undertake future conservation activities 4 . The objective of controlling access and benefit sharing is therefore to establish a market for biological diversity conservation that gathers into a market transaction all the costs of the impacts of biological diversity destruction and decline. The contract is the favored instrument for putting the regulation into effect because it allows private actors to set the terms and conditions of the transaction that are best suited to their particular circumstances.
The role of patents
Patents and other forms of intellectual property then take their place and role in delivering a part of the compensation (and incentive) contributing to the marginal private return 5 . This is achieved, at least in theory, by capturing some of the value from innovative, creative and useful applications of the accessed biological resources and returning this as part of the price paid for access and use of the biological resources through royalties or other benefits, such as, for example, access to and transfer of a new technology. In assessing whether contracts are an optimal form of regulation for conserving biological diversity, we must ask if patents can deliver value in addition to other benefits negotiated as part of the price of access, so that the marginal private returns from conservation activities (from all sources) are sufficient to at least correspond with their marginal P atents, along with access and benefit sharing, are critical components of conserving biodiversity. This was recognized by the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity 1 (CBD), which called for parties to the convention to ensure that patents support the CBD's objectives, including biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, and that incentive measures promote biodiversity conservation rather than its destruction and decline. The access and benefit sharing objectives of the CBD have now been implemented as a private contract model according to the voluntary Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization 2 . In short, the contract sets out the terms and conditions of access with patents contributing to the calculation of the price of access. The questions we must ask are, Does the access price properly reflect the true costs of biodiversity conservation, and What are the role and place of patents in contributing to the price of access? Why are these the critical questions?
The economic justification Developed, market-based economies have approached biological diversity conservation as a market failure, in general, accepting that a properly functioning competitive economy will not conserve biodiversity. This approach reflects the theory that the benefits of biological diversity conservation accrue to society and cannot be sufficiently captured by those likely to undertake the conservation-the marginal private returns from conservation activities do not correspond with their patents to promote biodiversity conservation, the challenge in implementing any new patent arrangements will be in adjusting the schemes for patents and other forms of intellectual property to suit conservation and sustainable-use objectives. This is an exciting prospect with the bonus of actually promoting biodiversity conservation. conservation 7 . However, the direct consequence is to place a consideration of the most appropriate patents settings (primarily the standard of obviousness) outside the consideration of whether they are contributing to, or undermining, biodiversity conservation, rather than integrating these policies to achieve the best biodiversity conservation outcomes.
Conclusions
We don't know whether the access price properly reflects the true costs of biodiversity conservation, and what are the role and place of patents in addressing the price of access. It seems very likely that the price of access is already too low, thus accounting for the ongoing record of biodiversity destruction and decline. If we do attempt to tailor (according to its definition and description) rather than its many and varied useful applications. As a consequence, the problems posed by patents have the potential to undermine the value of the accessed biological resource and other in situ biological resources by creating uncertain property and use rights in the tangible accessed materials, and the uses of that material in innovative or creative and useful embodiments, including other innovative or creative and useful embodiments. Resolving this problem rests, in the first instance, with imposing higher threshold standards (particularly obviousness) to clearly distinguish between different innovations and creations, that is, establishing clear property and use rights. This is not, however, so easy to resolve. A significant concern is that limiting existing intellectual property laws might scare potential bioprospectors and investors through claims to watering down or weakening intellectual property standards. This seems the most likely explanation for why nations maintain the primacy of intellectual property as nations perceive the immediate needs of investment in biological resource-based product research and development ahead of other policy imperatives, such as the longerterm goals and benefits of biological diversity a significant concern is that limiting existing intellectual property laws might scare potential bioprospectors and investors through claims to watering down or weakening intellectual property standards.
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